Some do’s and don’t in making sense of accidents and events

๐—ฆ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฒ ๐—ฑ๐—ผโ€™๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ฑ๐—ผ๐—ปโ€™๐˜ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ธ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜€๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜€๐—ฒ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ฒ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜๐˜€

Following an accident, I see so many people, even those from within the maritime industry (experts?), becoming opinionated and judgmental about seeing ships going โ€˜too closeโ€™ to the land.

Just so we are aligned, ships are not meant to navigate in deep waters (only). It is inevitable that most ships will navigate in the proximity of land. That is why we have not been able to do away with skilled mariners.

To avoid meaningless ego bolstering discussions that take us nowhere, hereโ€™s the three things you may need to consider when making sense of accidents:

๐Ÿญ. ๐—ฆ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฝ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ถ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐˜ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ. ๐—œ๐—ป๐˜€๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐—ฑ ๐—ฏ๐˜‚๐—ถ๐—น๐—ฑ ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐˜†๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ฒ.

โ€˜๐˜–๐˜ฏ๐˜ค๐˜ฆ ๐˜ถ๐˜ฑ๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ ๐˜ข ๐˜ต๐˜ช๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ธ๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ ๐˜ธ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ญ๐˜ฐ๐˜ข๐˜ฅ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ฃ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ข๐˜ด ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ ๐˜›๐˜ช๐˜ฎ๐˜ฃ๐˜ถ๐˜ฌ๐˜ต๐˜ถ ๐˜ธ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ธ๐˜ฐ๐˜ถ๐˜ญ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฆ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ ๐˜จ๐˜ฐ so ๐˜ค๐˜ญ๐˜ฐ๐˜ด๐˜ฆ ๐˜ต๐˜ฐ ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ญ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅโ€™. Well, this is not a banana carrier, and the accident did not happen in Timbuktu. While it is important to draw from past experiences, it is also important to be aware of the limits of your own expertise. Stay humble. Make an attempt to build on your past instead of reinforcing what you have always known.

๐Ÿฎ. ๐—ก๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ธ๐˜€ ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—น๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ฑ. ๐—•๐—ฎ๐—น๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—น๐˜€ ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ธ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด.

The accident happened because the ship deviated from the authorised plan; the ship went too close to the rocks; the captain deliberately allowed the ship to navigate close to the hazards. Underneath many of these knee-jerk reactions lies a deeper pattern. We like to believe in simplified narratives because want to be seen in control of the risks. Think carefully what risks can be really controlled (for example, maintenance and periodic checks of machinery) and which ones can only be tackled (for example, individual and collective perception of risk, culture, biases, motivation). Give equal (even more) consideration to the latter in making sense of the accidents.

๐Ÿฏ. ๐—ฆ๐˜„๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฐ๐—ต ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—บ ๐—•๐—น๐—ฎ๐—บ๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—น๐—น๐—ผ๐—ฐ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—”๐—ป๐˜…๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐˜๐˜† ๐— ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฎ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜

Something unexpected has happened. That is why it is an accident. It is a rare opportunity to think, reflect, relate with people involved and learn from them. Donโ€™t loose this opportunity by distancing yourself from those involved. โ€˜I would have never done this. Really?โ€™ Thatโ€™s denial and projection. Slow down and ask yourself, can this happen to me or someone who I know? It will enhance your organisationโ€™s ability to manage the unexpected. Even at a personal level, learning from setbacks and failures will only improve your chances of survival.

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